AppSec Days India 2026 Virtual Conference

The Shai Hulud worm family has stalked the npm supply chain across multiple variants, stealing credentials from developer and CI environments, propagating via stolen npm and GitHub identities, poisoning workflows, and carrying a dead switch that can wipe home directories on command. Version four just crossed a new line. SANDWORM_MODE, deployed across 19 malicious npm packages, keeps the full prior playbook and adds AI toolchain poisoning via MCP server injection into Claude Code, Claude Desktop,

AI‑assisted bug bounty has gone from niche experiment to mainstream workflow in less than a year. Open source toolchains like BugHunter, Claude‑BugBounty and autonomous “bug hunter AI” frameworks now orchestrate dozens of AI agents across recon, vuln discovery, validation and report drafting, wired directly into HackerOne/Bugcrowd scopes and real targets. But in many setups, these agents are treated as trusted copilots instead of high privilege software components with their own attack surface.

There are two kinds of security testers: the ones using AI, and the ones getting left behind. But the first group has a growing problem. Ask an AI whether testing is complete, and the answer is almost always “yes.” The real question is whether it actually exercised every agent skill, performed meaningful verification, and explored the important paths, or simply hallucinated confidence while missing critical issues. This talk introduces graph-based AI penetration testing, a practical alternative

I built a runtime filter for agent tool calls, felt pretty good about it, then spent a week trying to get past it. I got through four different ways in an afternoon. This is the attacker’s side of that story - how the sec